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Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Neil Munro 
 
At the third BRICS summit on Hainan Island in 2011, Russian president 
Dmitri Medvedev claimed that the BRICS countries – with the adhesion of South 
Africa – now included the ‘biggest states of three continents’ (Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 15 April 2011, p. 2). But it was much less clear that these five countries 
represented a sustainable model of political development over the medium or 
longer term. All of the countries have displayed increasing economic inequality 
over the past half century, while only one—India—could be classed as a mature, 
stable democracy. The papers in this special section focus on the two largest, 
most populous and least democratic of the BRICS, Russia and China, to examine 
the impact of economic inequality on their political trajectories.
1
  
The statistics detailing the socioeconomic growth of Russia and China are 
impressive. Taken together, the two countries account for 41 per cent of the total 
territory of the BRICs, and for 51 per cent of their total population and 63 per 
cent of their GDP. On Goldman Sachs (2007) projections, by 2050 China is 
slated to be the world’s largest economy, and Russia was to be its sixth largest. 
Despite this impressive record of economic growth, a striking feature of both 
countries is the non-egalitarian nature of their development – notwithstanding the 
(post)communist legacy. On most conventional measures, these two countries are 
now among the most unequal in the world. According to Russian official 
statistics, the decile ratio rose from 4 in 1990 to 16.5 in 2010, and the Gini 
coefficient from .26 to .42
2
; the best estimates of Chinese Gini coefficients 
indicate a very similar rise, from .26 in 1983 – just after the introduction of the 
contract responsibility system – to .49 in 2012 (Chen et al. 2010, p. 20; Wildau & 
Mitchell 2016).  
The widening of income inequalities has been an international 
phenomenon; but according to the United Nations 2010 Human Development 
Report, it has been ‘especially marked in the countries that were part of the 
former Soviet Union’ (p. 72). On their figures, Gini coefficients were already 
higher in Russia than in the United Kingdom, and higher in China than in the 
United States. One consequence was that both countries were increasingly well 
represented on Forbes’ list of the world’s billionaires: in the 2011 list China 
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doubled its representation to 115 (which took it to second place) and Russia was 
in third place with 101; there were more billionaires in Moscow at this time than 
in any other city in the world (Izvestiya, 11 March 2011, pp. 1, 3).  
What effect does such endemic economic inequality have on political 
stability? Aristotle pointed out in his Politics that ‘when men are equal they are 
contented’. He drew particular attention to the people of Tarentum, who, ‘by 
sharing the use of their own property with the poor, [gained] their good will’. 
Accordingly, ‘democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than 
oligarchy’ (Everson 1996, pp. 132, 160, 121). Concerns of this kind have been 
taken up by many later writers, including John Stuart Mill, who provided in his 
Representative Government for additional votes for those who exercised 
‘superior [managerial] functions’ on the belief that the poor would otherwise use 
their electoral preponderance to enact ‘class legislation’ (Lindsay 1964, pp. 282, 
285, 283).  
The relationship between economic inequality and political instability in 
Russia and China is the topic of this special section. The seven papers address 
different aspects of the relationship, and take different methodological 
approaches, but ultimately address a single core question: to what extent does 
inequality pose a challenge to the existing political systems?  
Political Instability in Russia and China 
The evidence suggests that economic inequality in Russia and China is both 
substantial and increasing. Official statistics are always subject to political 
manipulation—as was the case when Russia increased its official count of ‘the 
poor’ by more than 2 million in early 2011 to take account of the evidence of the 
2010 census (Kommersant, 4 July 2011, p. 3). There is however a substantial 
literature that can help us identify some of the shortcomings in official data and 
supplement them with independent estimates.
3
 For example, the Higher School of 
Economics has developed a comprehensive ‘index of wellbeing’ which shows 
that living standards for 40 per cent of the population are still below where they 
were at the end of the communist period, as if ‘two countries’ existed in parallel 
(Kukol 2011).  
In China, household income and expenditure surveys have generally 
confirmed that economic disparities have been increasing not only in monetary 
terms, but also across households and regions and between urban and rural areas 
(Cai et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2010; Liu 2010).
4
 Despite attempts to enhance 
welfare programs, the main thrust of the recent reforms has been to reduce or 
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even eliminate the ‘iron rice bowl’ approach to social protection. The social 
programs that have replaced them leave much of the population with scant 
protection in the event of sickness, old age or disability (Li and Zhong 2009; 
Duckett 2007, 2011). In both countries there are additional flows of ‘hidden 
income’, often related to corruption; on Chinese evidence about 75 per cent of 
this additional income accrues to those who already have higher incomes, 
widening inequalities still further (China Daily, 12 May 2010).  
The process by which political power has been converted into economic 
advantage has been documented in a range of studies. In Russia, as 
Kryshtanovskaya and White (2011) have shown, a form of ‘state capitalism’ has 
developed in which leading officials dominate the boards of the largest 
companies, and in particular what the authorities have defined as ‘strategic 
enterprises’ in fuel and energy, the military-industrial complex, and the 
infrastructure. The more important the company, the more likely it is to include 
ministers or even members of the presidential administration on its board. And 
these patterns have persisted, despite the enforced withdrawal of state officials 
from a number of high-profile company boards in 2011: first deputy premier 
Zubkov remained at Gazprom, deputy premier Sechin at Rosneftegaz, energy 
minister Shmatko at RusHydro and Zarubezhneft, and transport minister Levitin 
on the board of Sheremetevo airport (Moscow News, 5 July 2011, p. 2).  
For China, too, it is widely accepted that political power has enabled 
Communist Party (CCP) cadres and government officials to benefit 
disproportionately from economic growth (Goodman 2008). While government 
officials did not benefit from ‘nomenklatura privatisation’ in the same way as 
their Russian counterparts, they or their children had opportunities to acquire 
shares in state businesses (a notable phenomenon has been the children of 
officials engaging in business and in so doing benefitting from their parents’ 
political capital). For this and other reasons, current scholarship inclines towards 
the view that economic growth and marketisation are unlikely to lead to the 
emergence of new elites that might challenge the regime (Dickson 2003, 2008). 
This conclusion is based on an examination of the CCP’s organisation and 
structure, its corporatist strategy of developing business associations, the logic of 
co-option, the CCP’s strategy of adaptation in the light of lessons drawn from the 
Soviet collapse (see also Shambaugh 2008; Munro 2008), and surveys of 
entrepreneurs themselves.
5
  
The sustainability of authoritarian politics of a Russian or Chinese kind has 
been placed in doubt by sustained, high level economic growth. A rich and still-
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influential social science literature associated particularly with Lipset (1959) has 
suggested that rising levels of GDP will of themselves undermine authoritarian 
politics: societies will become more complex, professionals will increasingly 
combine to advance their own interests, and ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ will 
predispose political actors towards bargaining and accommodation rather than 
zero-sum confrontation. For some (e.g. Pye 1990), the changes that had taken 
place in Eastern Europe were indeed a demonstration of the explanatory power of 
modernization theories of this kind; but in the Russian case, its political system 
was actually more authoritarian in 2011 than it had been at the end of the Soviet 
period. Will postcommunist authoritarianism in Russia be undermined by a still-
developing society?  
In the case of China, scholars have documented a rising tide of popular 
protest which usually does not confront the regime directly, remaining concerned 
with local and particular interests. However, such protest often crossed the 
boundary from ‘official, prescribed politics’ to ‘politics by other means’ 
(O’Brien 2003; O’Brien and Li 2006; O’Brien 2008; Wasserstrom 2009; Cai 
2010). Elsewhere, Gilley (2004) has spoken of China’s ‘democratic future’ and 
Walter and Howie (2010) of the ‘fragile foundation of China’s extraordinary 
rise’. Advancing a contrary view, Whyte (2010b) and Wright (2010) emphasize 
tolerance and an acceptance of the status quo among the Chinese mass public. 
Studies intended for a wider audience have been equally divided: for Hutton 
(2007) there could in the end be no alternative to democracy and the rule of law, 
while Jacques (2009) places more emphasis on the adaptability of China’s 
distinctive culture. Meanwhile, in China itself, public expressions of discontent 
more than tripled in the five years to 2010, reaching 180,000 annually (Daily 
Telegraph, 29 July 2011).  
Overview of the Special Issue 
The articles that follow examine these themes from several different 
perspectives. While the central question concerns the implications of economic 
inequality for political stability, several papers approach the question from the 
perspective of institutions, while other papers use a range of public opinion data. 
Cook and Dimitrov adopt the former approach, and use social contract theory to 
explain political stability in communist autocracies. They argue that this stability 
is a consequence of an implicit exchange between the regime and the populace: 
citizens remain quiescent so long as the regime provides them with secure jobs, 
social services, subsidised housing and consumer goods. Cook and Dimitrov ask 
how well the social contract thesis applies in three different types of regimes. 
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First, they examine the socialist social contract in light of newly available 
archival evidence on the Soviet Union. Second, they examine the social contract 
in reform-era China and, third, in Putin’s Russia. They conclude that post-
socialist regimes create distinctive ‘market social contracts’. More specifically, 
communist and authoritarian leaders cater to the consumption needs of their 
populations in a strategic effort to remain in office.  
In rapidly expanding economies, the population shift from the country to 
the city creates particular tensions. This topic is examined by Danilova, who 
compares social inequality in Russia and China and how it is perceived by the 
urban population. The evidence comes from representative surveys of the adult 
population in two major cities, Shanghai and St Petersburg, using a strictly 
comparable methodology. The results from the surveys show that although 
people in Russia and China have broadly egalitarian attitudes, there are 
significant differences in the way in which they view the current system of 
distribution. Egalitarian attitudes are connected not only with the actual incomes 
but they are very powerfully affected by subjective assessments of the 
distributive system, which often involves political judgments. The article 
concludes that while there is a tendency towards the convergence of political 
regimes in two countries, there are different patterns of legitimacy based as much 
on culture as on economic achievements. In both countries, the ruling elites rely 
mainly on culture in order to strengthen their political monopoly.  
Economic crises can place social contracts under strain, stimulating 
demands for social protection whilst undermining the ability of the state to 
deliver it. Munro uses two waves of the World Values Survey spanning the 2008 
global financial crisis to analyse the determinants of support for state social 
welfare provision in a four-stage recursive model. He hypothesises that support is 
a function of economic self-interest, tapped by subjective economic satisfaction 
and relative income; ideology including beliefs about market fairness and 
inequality aversion; as well as temporal context. Munro finds that subjective 
economic satisfaction reduces support for greater welfare provision, while an 
aversion to inequality increases support. He also finds that public support for 
social welfare provisions increased over the period, no doubt reflecting popular 
feelings of economic insecurity.  
Using the same database, McAllister and White examine the impact of 
economic development on public support for democracy. The starting point for 
the analysis is the debate between those who believe that economic development 
is a pre-requisite for democracy, and those who reject this view believing instead 
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that economic prosperity is important only for ensuring democracy’s survival in 
the event of an existential threat. By using successive World Values Surveys 
conducted in Russia and China from 1990 onwards, McAllister and White are 
able to trace patterns of economic change and public support for democracy in 
the two countries over an extended period. The results show that education and, 
to a lesser extent, social mobility and economic attitudes, play an important role 
in promoting pro-democracy attitudes in both countries. The findings suggest that 
an increasingly large, tertiary-educated middle class may act as a potential driver 
for democratization in both countries.  
Recent research on authoritarian regimes argues that they provide public 
goods in order to prevent rebellion. Duckett and Wang take up this theme to 
examine how the Chinese state has accommodated the demands of large rural 
population. They show that the ‘threat of rebellion’ cannot explain Chinese party-
state policies to extend public goods to rural residents in the first decade of the 
21
st
 century. Drawing on theories of policy making, Duckett and Wang argue that 
China’s one-party regime has extended public goods to the rural population 
under the influence of ideas and policy options generated by policy communities 
of officials, researchers, international organisations and other actors. The party 
centre adopted and implemented these ideas and policy options when they 
provided solutions to external shocks and supported economic development 
goals. Political institutions have also played a role, notably by encouraging 
officials to develop and experiment with policies. Overall, Duckett and Wang 
suggest that explanations of policies and their outcomes in authoritarian political 
systems need to take into account how institutions shape policy making and the 
influence of policy communities and their ideas 
 In summary, the research reported in this special section has not found 
evidence that authoritarian regimes in Russia and China are especially at risk of 
political instability as a consequence of the inequality which has arisen during 
market reforms. Rather, both regimes have shown an ability to adapt to rising 
inequality by developing new strategies of self-legitimation to replace 
Communist ideology, and by developing or adapting social programmes to meet 
the needs, however minimally, of key sections of the population. This does not 
mean that the Russian and Chinese people have abandoned their aversion to 
inequality or are happy with existing levels of social protection. However, the 
Russian and Chinese regimes have shown themselves to be skilled at managing 
the policy agenda, guiding public opinion and co-opting or repressing political 
opposition. In these circumstances, we do not think that economic inequality 
poses significant danger to either regime.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
  Both countries have already been the subject of a substantial comparative 
literature. See, for instance, Nolan 1995, Ma 2000, Jha 2002, Marsh 2005, 
Larsson 2006, Chen 2009, Song 2009. 
2
  www.gks.ru, accessed 27 August 2011. 
3
  In the Russian case this includes Shkaratan (2009) and Tikhonova (2011) 
as well as numerous studies by Zaslavskaya (e.g. 2004) and 
Rimashevskaya (e.g. 2007). 
4
  Major contributions include Whyte (2010a), Wang (2008), Bian (2002) 
and Khan and Riskin (2001), as well as edited collections by Davis and 
Wang (2009), Wan (2008), and Shue and Wong (2007). 
5
  Similar arguments concerning China’s new rich have been presented by 
Tsai (2007) and Chen (2002). 
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